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ABSTRACT 
 
The mounting attention given to audit committees following a series of corporate financial 
reporting failures has resulted in numerous provisions within Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX hereafter) 
of 2002. The SOX addresses aspects of the audit committee, including its authority and 
composition characteristics, but the requirement for minimum meeting frequency for the audit 
committee member was absent from the final SOX provision despite the recommendations of 
regulators. Since audit committee activity, or degree of audit committee diligence, is determined 
by the audit committee itself, we investigate various firm-level and governance attributes that 
likely influence audit committees’ choice to meet more often than anticipated.   
 
After analyzing a sample of 2,715 firm-year observations spanning fiscal years 1998-2003, we 
find that audit committee diligence is positively associated with audit committee attributes such as 
financial expertise, but negatively association with audit committee tenure, suggesting that 
efficiency gains are enjoyed by audit committees as they become more familiar with firm-specific 
reporting issues. We also document positive associations between audit committee diligence and 
both governance and agency cost variables.  Finally, we document a significant increase in audit 
committee diligence in the years following the implementation of the SOX 2002 provisions.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
ver the past two decades, a growing amount of attention has been given to the audit committee’s role in 
the financial reporting process and, in particular, its potential effect on the quality of financial 
statements (see DeZoort et al., 2002; SOX 2002).  The focus on audit committees resulted in a number 
of SOX 2002 provisions that address the composition and behavior of corporate audit committees.  Despite the 
concerns expressed by policy makers and echoed by the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission 
(hereafter, BRC) on Improving Audit Committee Effectiveness, the final provisions of SOX 2002 do not require that 
a minimum number of meetings be held by the audit committee during the fiscal year (Levitt, 1998; BRC, 1999).  
Recent studies suggest that a great deal of variation exists in audit committee activity regardless of regulators’ 
concern about inactive audit committees, with most audit committees meeting no more than the company’s audit 
committee charter requires (Carcello et al., 2002).  The purpose of this study is to identify attributes that explain 
audit committee diligence.  In other words, why do some audit committees meet more than anticipated?   
 
Given the lack of authoritative guidance beyond the BRC recommendation of holding a minimum of four 
meetings during a fiscal year, the degree of diligence is essentially left to the discretion of the audit committee itself.  
We would expect to observe audit committees meeting at least quarterly given the frequency of corporate filings 
with the SEC.  Since the audit committee is a subset of the board of directors and its members also participate in 
general board meetings, we would also expect the audit committee to meet at least as often as the board.  In fact, a 
review of audit committee charters by Carcello et al. (2002) reveals that, on average, audit committees meet no more 
than expected as the mean number of meeting required by the audit committee charter (3.31) is approximately equal 
O 
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to the mean number of meetings actually held (3.54).  This finding suggests that the typical audit committee does not 
meet more than it is required to and that certain audit committees that choose to be more actively engaged in the 
financial reporting process may possess unique attributes that explain its audit committee diligence.  Our sample size 
confirms this apathy as approximately 20% of our sample meets more than the board of directors, suggesting that 
audit committee meeting frequency may simply be a matter of convenience rather than a desire to perform effective 
oversight of the financial reporting process.   
 
In response to the perceived relevance of audit committee activity, researchers have adopted audit 
committee meeting frequency as a proxy for audit committee diligence and observed some financial reporting 
benefits for companies with active audit committees (DeZoort et al., 2002).  Related studies document a variety of 
factors that possibly explain meeting frequency, including agency costs and governance characteristics (Menon and 
Williams, 1994; Collier and Gregory, 1999; Raghunandan and Rama, 2007; Sharma et al., 2009).  This study 
extends this line of inquiry by exploring audit committee level attributes that likely influence audit committees’ 
decisions to hold an extraordinary number of meetings during a fiscal year.  Specifically, we examine whether 
committee members’ collective experiences on a company’s audit committee (i.e., audit committee tenure) and 
financial expertise (i.e., background in accounting) are associated with the degree of diligence exhibited by the audit 
committee.  Given the voluntary nature of meeting frequency and the autonomy allotted to the audit committee, 
there is still relatively little known about the audit committee characteristics that help explain why certain audit 
committees are more active (i.e., diligent) than the board of directors or meet more often than recommended by the 
Blue Ribbon Commission.  By examining the audit committee’s incremental effort relative to a routine benchmark, 
we are better situated to measure audit committee diligence and, therefore, gain more insight into the audit 
committee, governance and agency attributes that affect diligence.  
  
This study’s sample period includes 2,715 firm-year observations of S&P Small, Mid and Large-Cap 
companies spanning fiscal years 1998-2003.  Consistent with prior research, we document a positive and significant 
association between audit committee diligence, firm size, board independence, presence of a Big 5 auditor and 
increased levels of diligence during the period following the implementation of the SOX 2002 provisions.  At the 
audit committee level, we hypothesize and find that active committees are associated with the presence of financial 
experts, but that firm-specific knowledge reduces the need for frequent meetings.  We also document an increased 
level of meeting activity following the implementation of SOX 2002, suggesting that the attention given to audit 
committees during that period was a sufficient catalyst for increased audit committee diligence and that establishing 
minimum meeting requirements may be unnecessary at this time.    
 
Our results extend related research that investigates the determinants of audit committee activity (Menon 
and Williams, 1994; Collier and Gregory, 1999; Raghunandan and Rama, 2007; Sharma et al., 2009).  The primary 
contribution of our study is the consideration of audit committees that meet more than anticipated.  The Blue Ribbon 
Commission recommends that audit committees meet at least quarterly.   By employing a measure of abnormal 
meeting frequency, we are able to examine and document the characteristics of committees that exhibit what is 
perceived to be extraordinary diligence (DeZoort et al., 2002).  We also corroborate recent research which suggests 
that there are financial reporting benefits of firm-specific experience of auditors and that investors price firm-
specific risk (Easley and O’Hare, 2004; Francis, 2004).  Our study is unique in that we document a significant 
association between firm-specific knowledge, as proxied for by audit committee tenure, and audit committee 
diligence.  This supports the argument that firm-specific knowledge exists since greater tenure may allow the 
committee greater oversight efficiency and, therefore, require it to meet less frequently.  Finally, we document a 
significant increase in audit committee activity in the period following the implementation of the SOX 2002, 
suggesting that audit committees were responsive to the growing pressure from regulators.   
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Audit Committees and Corporate Governance 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) provide a theoretical description of the separation of ownership and control 
within a firm that gives rise to agency costs and serves as a catalyst for the evolution of various governance 
mechanisms designed to mitigate these costs.  Firms that find it relatively more efficient to internalize the cost of 
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monitoring will rely primarily on the board of directors to provide adequate oversight of management’s performance 
and reduce agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 1984).  The ability of directors to use financial 
accounting information to monitor managerial performance and reduce agency costs is, in part, a function of the 
board’s ability to effectively oversee the creation of this information during the financial reporting process 
(Bushman and Smith, 2001)
1
.  Consequently, the duty to enhance the quality of financial information is charged to 
the audit committee of the board of directors.  Since the audit committee ultimately approves the financial 
statements that are submitted to the board of directors and then filed with the SEC, audit committee members have 
the opportunity to significantly influence the quality of earnings presented to the investing public. 
 
The importance of audit committee oversight has evolved throughout the 1900’s, as evidenced by 
numerous recommendations from financial institutions that firms form audit committees dating as far back as the 
Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934.  However, it was not until the early 1990’s that publicly traded companies listed 
on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX were required to have an audit committee as part of their governance structure 
(BRC, 1999).  Facing the possibility of regulatory action, the major exchanges created a Blue Ribbon Committee in 
1999 to examine the audit committee characteristics that were presumed to affect monitoring effectiveness, and 
eventually issued several recommendations (e.g., independence from management) that were, in part, adopted by the 
exchanges as listing requirements.  Congress took additional steps to improve investor confidence in accounting 
information by mandating many of the previous recommendations regarding audit committee characteristics and 
behavior (e.g., SOX 2002; NYSE 2005).  Although SOX 2002 gives ample attention to audit committees, and 
despite regulatory concern, SOX 2002 provisions fail to establish a minimum number of annual meetings to be held 
by the audit committee.  Thus, firms are left with BRC’s recommendation of at least four audit meetings per fiscal 
year as guidance for adequate audit committee activity.  
 
Audit Committees and Financial Reporting Quality 
 
Initially, audit committee research focused on the existence and benefits of audit committees.  Early studies 
explored the characteristics of firms that explore Bradbury (1992) first explores the characteristics of New Zealand 
companies that voluntarily formed audit committees are characterized by board of director size and a greater degree 
of director ownership.  Menon and Williams (1994) continue this line of inquiry and find that voluntary audit 
committee formation is associated with the use of a Big 8 auditor and board independence.  Wild (1996) later 
explores the financial reporting benefits of maintaining audit committees and documents a positive association 
between audit committee existence and the firm’s earnings quality. 
 
As the audit committee literature stream has evolved, efforts have been made to compartmentalize audit 
committee research into four areas: composition, authority, resources, and diligence (DeZoort et al., 2002).  
Research has focused primarily on the commitment of the audit committee to its monitoring duties (i.e., diligence) 
and the characteristics of the audit committee members (i.e., composition), as these factors tend to be more readily 
observable.   
 
Composition studies initially examined the effect of audit committee attributes on various financial 
reporting outcomes.  Audit committee member independence appears to be associated with higher financial 
reporting quality (Carcello and Neal, 2003; Krishnan, 2005; Klein, 2002; Bedard et al., 2004).  Financial reporting 
problems, including earnings management, restatements, and accruals quality, are negatively associated with various 
proxies of audit committee financial expertise (e.g., Xie et al., 2003; Bedard et al., 2004; Carcello et al., 2006; 
Dhaliwal et al., 2006). Other audit committee characteristics, such as greater director experience, less ownership by 
audit committee members and larger audit committees appear to be associated with higher earnings quality (Bedard 
et al., 2004, Yang and Krishnan, 2005).   
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Several studies have examined the role of the board of directors in the financial reporting process and generally document a 
positive association between strong governance attributes and various financial reporting quality proxies (Beasley 1996; Beasley 
et al. 2000; Klein 2002; and Bedard et al. 2004). 
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Several audit committee diligence studies employ audit committee meeting frequency as an explanatory 
variable to examine whether meeting frequency, amongst other attributes, leads to higher quality financial reporting.  
Generally, the findings indicate that firms are less likely to be sanctioned by the SEC or engage in less earnings 
management are associated with more active audit committees (McMullen and Raghunanden, 1996; Abbot et al., 
2000; Bedard et al., 2004).   
 
Determinants of Audit Committee Diligence  
 
Audit Committee Meeting Frequency 
 
Researchers have also employed the number of annual audit committee meetings as a dependent variable 
and attempt to document the determinants of audit committee activity.  DeZoort et al. (2002) argues that audit 
committee diligence as proxied for by the number of annual meetings is reflected in the effort invested by the 
committee in its oversight duties.  Audit committees that meet more frequently are more likely to become aware of 
financial reporting issues that may ultimately affect the quality of reported earnings.   
 
Several studies have explored the possible determinants of audit committee meeting frequency.  Menon and 
Williams (1994) concluded that agency costs play a role in the frequency of annual committee meetings by 
documenting that firm size and board of director independence have positive associations with meeting frequency.  
Collier and Gregory (1999) focus their analysis on a sample of firms from the United Kingdom and measures audit 
committee in terms of the hours spent conducting audit committee meetings.  Their findings are, in part, consistent 
with Menon and Williams (1994) agency costs argument, as firms with Big Six auditors, or that are highly 
leveraged, are more likely to have relatively more active audit committees, while firms with weak director 
independence conduct fewer audit committee meetings.  More recently, Raghunandan and Rama (2007) focus on 
fiscal year 2003 and include an expanded set of variables to explain variation in audit committee activity.  Their 
findings indicate that agency costs such as firm size, presence of block holders on the board, litigation risk, as well 
as governance characteristics like board meeting frequency, audit committee size and audit committee financial 
expertise all increase audit committee meeting frequency.  A subsequent study by Sharma et al. (2009) focuses on 
New Zealand firms and provides somewhat contradictory results in that the presence of Big 4 auditors, growth and 
litigation risk are negatively associated with audit committee meeting frequency, yet audit committee independence 
and size, as well as managerial ownership, appear to have a negative association with meeting frequency. 
 
Our study assesses audit committee diligence from a different perspective by examining the characteristics 
of firms that appear to meet more often than would be expected.  Using the BRC’s recommended annual meeting 
frequency and the board of director meeting frequency as benchmarks, we measure the degree to which an audit 
committee excels in its financial reporting oversight efforts.  By examining the determinants of the audit 
committee’s incremental effort, we are able to better understand the audit committee, governance and agency costs 
attributes that are associated with audit committee diligence.   
 
Audit Committee Tenure 
 
Experience serving on a particular audit committee may also affect audit committee diligence.  Francis et 
al. (2004) provides evidence that investors price firm-specific information risk which suggests that firms have 
unique information environments.  Since the audit committee is charged with overseeing the financial reporting 
process, it seems reasonable that over a period of time, audit committee effectiveness and efficiency would be 
impacted by the degree to which committee members familiarize themselves with firm-specific financial reporting 
issues.  Positive outcomes have been documented in the auditor-client relationship.  It apparently takes the audit 
team a period of time to become aware of the client’s business model and unique accounting issues during the early 
stages of the relationship, with the benefits of this knowledge acquisition manifesting itself in later years (Johnson et 
al., 2002; Carcello and Nagy, 2004).   
 
Psychology research confirms a learning effect as people develop credible knowledge sets regarding a 
given task as experience with the task increases, thus leading to an improvement in task performance (Mazur and 
Hastie, 1978).  Related research in the accounting setting confirms this phenomenon (Libby, 1993).  For example, 
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successful performance of audit tasks appears to be related to both practice and feedback (Bonner and Walker, 
1994).  Experienced subjects are more likely to succeed at difficult tasks by relying on heuristics that provide an 
advantage relative to less experienced subjects, suggesting that experience results in efficiency gains 
(Ahdolmohammadi and Wright, 1987).      
 
Although research shows that extended board of director tenure may provide financial reporting benefits, 
the literature has not yet addressed whether audit committee knowledge acquisition results in more effective and 
efficient monitoring practices by focusing on the tenure of specific audit committee members (Beasley, 1996; 
Bedard et al., 2004; Cohen at al., 2004).  Learning effects could surface in the audit committee setting as it becomes 
more familiar with management’s reporting practices and that this knowledge, over time, could lead to more 
efficient performance of its oversight activities.  As an audit committee’s firm-specific knowledge is acquired, firms 
with long-serving committee members may enjoy efficiencies that provide sufficient oversight with fewer meetings.  
We therefore hypothesize a negative association between audit committee tenure and audit committee diligence.   
 
H1: Audit committee diligence is negatively associated with audit committee tenure.  
 
Audit Committee Financial Expertise and Size 
 
The financial expertise of audit committee members has also received considerable attention in the 
literature.  By increasing the committee members’ accounting and finance-related knowledge, the degree of financial 
expertise should improve audit committee effectiveness.  Initial investigations into the financial reporting 
implications of audit committee expertise generally suggest that expertise improves the quality of financial 
statements.  Financial reporting problems, including earnings management, restatements and accruals quality, are 
negatively related to various proxies of audit committee expertise (e.g., Xie et al., 2003; Bedard et al., 2004; 
Carcello et al., 2006; Dhaliwal et al., 2006). 
 
Financial experts are more likely to pursue technical issues which likely lead to more meeting activity.  If 
financial expertise mitigates earnings management as some studies suggest, then those efforts likely require more 
meetings amongst management, auditors and the audit committee.  In a related study, Raghunandan and Rama 
(2007) controls for audit committee financial expertise as a potential determinant of audit committee activity, and 
find a marginally significant, positive association between the two attributes.  We hypothesize that audit committee 
financial expertise will increase audit committee diligence.   
  
H2: Audit committee diligence is positively associated with audit committee financial expertise. 
  
Audit committee size has also been identified as a potential factor influencing audit committee activity.  
Firms’ willingness to expend resources to maintain large audit committees reflects an overall commitment to 
monitoring.  Early governance studies investigate this at the board level and document a positive association 
between the board size and the board meeting activity (e.g., Vafeas, 1999; Raghunandan and Rama, 2007 and 
Sharma et al., 2009) also document similar associations between audit committee size and audit committee meeting 
frequency.  Therefore, we anticipate observing a similar association between audit committee size and audit 
committee diligence. 
 
H3: Audit committee diligence is positively associated with audit committee size. 
 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Characteristics 
 
 The financial reporting process and the quality of the information it produces is likely affected by board 
level mechanisms governance.  Following prior research, we consider several governance characteristics including 
board size, board independence and board meeting frequency that possibly affect accounting information quality, as 
well as the degree to which audit committees commit to the committees’ financial reporting oversight 
responsibilities (Menon and Williams, 1994; Vafeas, 1999; Collier and Gregory et al., 1999; Francis, 2004; 
Raghunandan and Rama, 2007; Sharma et al., 2009).   
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Independent boards are indicative of strong governance and are more prone to encourage management 
oversight activity.  Larger boards are more likely to have a greater pool of directors from which to select audit 
committee members that can be tasked solely with financial reporting duties, thus freeing them from other 
directorship responsibilities and making frequent meetings possible.  Given the logistics of conducting and 
assembling board meetings, audit committees are likely to have meetings since they are already present at the board 
meetings.  Consequently, we anticipate observing a positive association between audit committee diligence and 
board independence, board size and board meeting frequency and make the following hypothesis:  
 
H4: Audit committee diligence is positively associated with strong governance characteristics. 
  
Agency Costs Related Firm Characteristics  
 
Firm Size 
 
Menon and Williams (1994) first documents an association between audit committee activity and higher 
agency costs by observing a positive association between audit committee activity and firm size.  Other studies have 
since confirmed these results, corroborating the notion that the larger firms experience an increased demand for 
monitoring efforts due the ongoing scrutiny placed on such firms by market analysts, and since the relative cost of 
such efforts become less expensive given the marginal benefit of such investments (Collier and Gregory, 1999; 
Raghunandan and Rama, 2007; Sharma, et al., 2009).  In other words, larger firms have more to gain by maintaining 
stronger, more diligent audit committees.   
 
Leverage 
 
Agency costs are also associated with highly leveraged firms, and appear to influence the quality of firms’ 
governance mechanisms demanded by debt holders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1990).  
Debt holders also rely on accounting information to resolve to assess the liquidity positions of firms when making 
credit-related decisions and often employ financial ratios as debt covenants to mitigate exposure to default risk 
(DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Bushman and Smith, 2001; Andersen et al., 2004).  Menon and Williams (1994) 
hypothesize and Collier and Gregory (1999) document a marginally significant, positive association between 
meeting activity and firm leverage.  If audit committees’ efforts improve the quality of the financial reporting 
process, and highly-leveraged firms rely on accounting information to reduce agency costs, such firms have 
incentives to invest in their audit committees and to expect greater audit committee diligence. 
 
Growth 
 
 Growth firms often experience high agency costs as prior research documents lower earnings quality for 
firms during the early stages of the business cycle (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Abbot et al., 2000).  The resulting 
agency costs likely create greater monitoring demands, which can manifest in greater effort by the audit committee.  
Growth firms also experience greater pressure to report favorable earnings trends, yet lack an established history of 
financial reporting quality that corroborates the integrity of current financial information (Raghunandan and Rama, 
2007).  By holding more audit committee meetings, firms may exhibit more diligence over the financial reporting 
process, thus reducing the firm’s stakeholders’ perceived information risk and resulting agency costs.   
 
Litigation Risk 
 
We also anticipate that litigation risk faced by firms in certain industry possibly affects the audit 
committee’s desire to signal to financial statement users that frequent committee meetings enhances the reliability of 
the firm’s financial statement information.  Firms in the pharmaceutical, computers, electronics, retail and software 
industries face a greater likelihood of facing lawsuits as a result of misleading disclosures that ultimately contribute 
to significant stock price declines and subsequent shareholder lawsuits (Francis et al., 1994; Raghunandan and 
Rama, 2007).  In certain cases, accounting practices unique to a particular industry (i.e., capitalization of software 
development costs) could be employed opportunistically and eventually lead to stock price volatility and shareholder 
lawsuits (Kasznik and Lev, 1995).     
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Big Five Auditor 
 
By retaining a Big 5 auditor
2
 and paying a premium for higher quality audits, firms can communicate their 
commitment to an effective financial reporting process.  Big 5 auditors seek to preserve their reputation performing 
higher quality audits and are therefore desired by firms that seek to reduce agency costs (Francis and Wilson, 1988; 
DeFond, 1992; Francis et al., 1999; Francis, 2004).  In turn, Big 5 firms are also more likely to place importance in 
the role of audit committees as Big 5 firms were early advocates for the voluntary formation of audit committees by 
publically traded companies (Menon and Williams, 1994).   
 
If the use of Big 5 auditors signals a firm’s desire to reduce agency costs, and Big 5 auditors place 
importance on the role of the audit committee in the financial reporting oversight process, then Big 5 firms are more 
likely to advocate frequent participation of the audit committee throughout the financial reporting process.  
Therefore, we also consider the possible effect of the retention of a Big 5 auditor and audit committee diligence.   
 
H5: Firms that experience high agency costs will be associated with more diligent audit committees  
 
 For H5 to be supported, we would expect to observe positive associations between our audit committee 
diligence variable specifications and our proxies for firm size, leverage, growth, litigation risk and the presence of a 
Big 4 auditor.   
 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
 
We also control for the post-SOX 2002 period as the increased regulatory scrutiny surrounding the audit 
committee possibly influenced audit committees’ propensity to meet despite the lack of SOX 2002 meeting 
requirements.  Beasley et al. (2009) argue that SOX greatly increased expectations for audit committees, and 
research studies have documented financial reporting behavior around the implementation of SOX 2002 and 
generally find that earnings quality improved in the wake of the legislation (Gordon et al., 2006; Lobo and Zhou, 
2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Heflin and Hsu, 2008).  If audit committees influence the favorable changes in financial 
reporting behavior following the implementation of SOX 2002 provisions, we would expect that to be reflected by 
an increase in audit committee diligence.  Therefore, we make the following hypothesis: 
 
H6: Audit committee diligence is positively associated with regulatory pressure of SOX 2002 
 
METHODOLOGY AND MODEL DEVELOPMENT  
 
Sample Selection 
 
Our sample includes 2,715 firm-year observations from an approximately equal distribution of S&P Small, 
Mid-Cap and Large-Cap firms, for fiscal years 1998-2003.  The firms’ related proxy statements were examined and 
governance data, such as committee and board size, financial expertise, meeting frequency, director independence 
and tenure and were collected.  Committee member biographies were examined to determine whether members 
possessed professional experience in either accounting or finance and the audit committee tenure variable measured 
how long the particular director served on the firm’s audit committee.  Using meeting frequency data, we also 
constructed our proxies for audit committee diligence.  Compustat data was used to construct the remaining the 
remaining agency costs variables as well as auditor type. 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
 We attempt to capture audit committee diligence by measuring the incremental meeting activity of audit 
committees.  First, we compute AC_BRC_Ratio by dividing the number of annual audit committee meetings by the 
four meetings recommended by the BRC.  Although it is not mandated, the BRC’s recommendation represents the 
                                                 
2 The sample period covers the pre- and post-Andersen, LLP periods.  Therefore we simply refer to both Big Five and Big Four 
audit firms during the respective time periods as Big Five. 
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closest form of regulatory guidance regarding the minimum number of meetings audit committees should conduct in 
order to effectively execute the committee’s oversight duties.  By measuring the degree to which audit committees 
exceed this minimum threshold, we are better able to assess the characteristics of audit committees that appear to be 
more diligently performing their oversight responsibilities.   
 
The ratio of audit committee meetings to board of director meetings (AC_BOD_Ratio) is computed to help 
determine the extent to which audit committees meet independently from the board of directors.  Audit committee 
meetings are likely to occur during board of director meetings since the committee members would already be 
present at general board of director sessions.  If the audit committee’s willingness to meet is driven simply by the 
convenience of doing so, then the audit committee’s commitment to effective oversight of the financial reporting 
process may be questionable.  By measuring the degree to which audit committees are willing to meet in addition to 
scheduled board of director meetings, we improve our ability to assess the characteristics that help explain why 
some audit committees are more diligent monitors of firms’ financial reporting processes than others.  
 
Explanatory Variables 
 
Model 1 includes several audit committee variables that may also be associated with audit committee 
diligence.  Throughout our analysis we include alternating proxies for audit committee tenure (ACT) that measure 
the total number years that existing committee members have collectively served on the audit committee 
(AC_Tenure_Sum) and a second variable, AC_Tenure_Avg, which represents the average tenure of directors serving 
on the firm’s audit committee.  Fin_Exprt is the percentage of audit committee members with finance or accounting 
backgrounds during the year and AC_Size is the number of directors serving on the audit committee during the fiscal 
year.   
 
Other governance mechanisms include the number of board members (BOD_Size), the proportion of 
independent directors serving on the board (BOD_Indp) and the number of board of director meetings held during 
the fiscal year (BOD_Mtgs).  Our analyses also include proxies for agency costs.  Firm Size (Size) is equal to the 
firm’s total assets3.  Leverage (LEV) is the debt-to-asset ratio and (Growth) is the market-to-book ratio.  Litigation 
Risk (Lit_Risk) is a dichotomous variable equal to one when the firm-year observation is from a high risk industry 
(SIC 2833-2836; 3570-3577; 3600-3674; 5200-5961; or 7370), zero otherwise.  Auditor type (Big_Five) is given a 
value of takes value one if the firm is audited by a big five (four) auditor, zero otherwise.  We also control for the 
potential effect of the passage and implementation of SOX 2002 by including an indicator variable (SOX) that equals 
one if the fiscal year is either 2002 or 2003 (i.e., the post-SOX sample period).  
 
Descriptive Statistics  
 
 Table 1, Panel A, provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analyses during fiscal years 
1998-2003.  Audit committees in our sample meet an average of five times and, therefore, on average, meet only 
once more than the four times recommended by the BRC.  Relative to board meeting activity, audit committees 
appear to be less active than their boards as the ratio of audit committee meetings to board meetings 
(AC_BOD_Ratio) was 0.78.  Both proxies for audit committee tenure reveal that the average aggregate experience 
of directors serving on the firm’s audit committee (AC_Tenure_Sum) is 18.6 years and that audit committee 
members have, on average, 4.66 years of experience (AC_Tenure_Avg) on the firm’s audit committee.  The 
percentage of the firm’s audit committee members with finance or accounting background (Fin_Exprt) is 0.13.  The 
median audit committee size (AC_Size) is four. 
 
Panel B of Table 1 includes our samples governance characteristics.  The typical board of directors contains 
about ten directors (BOD_Size = 9.59), nearly seven of which are independent of the firm’s management 
(BOD_Indp = 0.68).  The average number of board meetings (BOD_Mtgs) is 7.01, exceeding the frequency of audit 
committee meetings 5.03 reported in Panel A.  Other firm characteristics are provided in Panel C of Table 1 and 
indicate that our sample is comprised of moderately leveraged (LEV = 0.23), highly valued, growth firms (Growth = 
                                                 
3 The natural log of total assets was used as the proxy for firm size during the statistical analysis. Total assets are presented in 
Table 1 as part of the descriptive statistics. 
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3.48), of which nearly on quarter are from highly litigious industries (Lit_Risk = 0.27).  Almost ninety-eight percent 
of sample firms were audited by Big Five audit firms during our sample period.    
 
 
Table 1:  Summary Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variable Name N Mean Std. dev. Median Q2 Q3
AC_Mtg_Freq 2715 5.03 2.74 4.00 3.00 6.00
AC_BRC_Ratio 2715 1.25 0.68 1.00 0.75 1.50
AC_BOD_Ratio 2715 0.78 0.46 0.66 0.50 1.00
AC_Tenure_Avg 2715 4.66 1.56 4.60 3.50 5.66
AC_Tenure_Sum 2715 18.63 8.62 18.00 12.00 24.00
Fin_Exprt 2715 0.13 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.25
AC_Size 2715 3.79 1.13 4.00 3.00 4.00
BOD_Size 2715 9.59 2.60 9.00 8.00 11.00
BOD_Indp 2715 0.68 0.17 0.70 0.57 0.81
BOD_Mtgs 2715 7.01 2.83 6.00 5.00 8.00
Assets 2715 10025.06 41037.55 2087.03 735.82 7080.1
Lev 2715 0.23 0.16 0.24 0.10 0.34
Growth 2715 3.48 2.97 2.48 1.69 4.11
Lit_Risk 2715 0.27 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00
Big_Five 2715 0.97 0.14 1.00 1.00 1.00
Panel B: Governance Characteristics
Panel A: Audit Committee Characteristics
Panel C: Firm Characteristics
 
 
Variable name Description 
Audit Committee Characteristics 
AC_Mtg_Freq  Number of audit committee meetings held during the fiscal year 
AC_BRC_Ratio  Number of audit committee meetings held during the year divided by the four meetings recommended 
by the Blue Ribbon Committee 
AC_BOD_Ratio  The number of annual audit committees divided by the number annual of a board of director meetings 
held during the fiscal year 
AC_Tenure_Avg  The total number of years the audit committee members have collectively served on the firm’s audit 
committee divided by the number of audit committee members serving during the fiscal year 
AC_Tenure_Sum  The total number of years the audit committee members have collectively served on the firm’s audit 
committee 
Fin_Exprt  The percentage of audit committee members with experience in either accounting or finance 
AC_Size   The number of audit committee members  
Governance Characteristics 
BOD_Size  The number of board members 
BOD_Ind  The percentage of independent directors on the board 
BOD_Mtgs  The total number of meetings held by the board of directors during the fiscal year 
Firm Characteristics 
Size Total Assets  
Lev Debt-to-asset ratio 
Growth  The market-to-book ratio 
Lit_Risk  Take value 1 if the firm’s standard industry classification code falls within the following ranges (2833-
2836; 3570-3577; 3600-3674; 5200-5961; or 7370), otherwise Lit_Risk = 0 
Big_Five Takes value of 1 if the firm is audited by a big five (four) auditor, zero otherwise 
 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 We test our hypotheses by conducting a series of univariate and regression analyses.  Correlation analysis is 
first used to demonstrate potential support for our hypotheses, while multivariate analyses confirm such associations 
after controlling for other relevant factors. 
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AC_Diligenceit  =   β0 + β1ACTit  + β2 Fin_Exprtit +  β3 AC_Sizeit   + β4BOD_Sizeit 
+ Β5BOD_INDP it  + Β6BOD_Mtgs it  + β7Sizeit  + β8Levit +   
Β9Growthit  +  β10Lit_Riskit + β11Big_Fiveit + β12SOXit +  Єi       
 
Model 1 above regresses the general form of our audit committee diligence proxies on various audit 
committee, governance proxies, and agency costs proxies.  We also include control variables for year and industry 
effects (not shown above).  In addition to the model variables described above, AC_Diligence represents audit 
committee diligence and is defined as either AC_BRC_Ratio or AC_BOD_Ratio throughout the statistical analysis.  
ACT represents audit committee tenure and is defined as either AC_Tenure_Avg or AC_Tenure_Sum.  If our 
hypotheses are supported, we would expect to expect to see significant, positive coefficients on each explanatory 
variable, with the exception of audit committee tenure (ACTit).   
 
RESULTS 
 
Univariate Results 
 
 We begin our analysis by performing univariate tests (untabulated) of our primary hypotheses in which we 
tests for significant correlations between the Model 1 explanatory variables and our two proxies for audit committee 
diligence, the ratio of the number of audit committee meetings to the BRC’s four recommended meetings 
(AC_BRC_Ratio) and the ratio of the number audit committee meetings to board of director meetings 
(AC_BOD_Ratio).  According to the Pearson correlation test, the coefficients indicate that our proxies for audit 
committee diligence are significantly correlated with the independent variables in the hypothesized direction.  The 
audit committee characteristics (Panel A) are almost all positive and significantly correlated with each of the audit 
committee diligence proxies. Committees with a higher degree of financial expertise (Fin_Exprt) and a greater 
degree of committee-specific tenure (AC_Tenure_Avg and AC_Tenure_Sum) are positive and significantly 
correlated with the degree of audit committee diligence (AC_BRC_Ratio and AC_BOD_Ratio).  Unexpectedly, 
larger audit committees (AC_Size) are positively and significantly correlated with committee diligence as measured 
by the BRC ratio though not the BOD ratio. The governance characteristics are consistent with our hypotheses as 
larger (BOD_Size), more independent (BOD_Indp) and active boards (BOD_Mtg_Freq) are positive and 
significantly correlated with our audit committee diligence proxies.  The agency cost proxies (Size, LEV, and 
Big_Five) and the diligence proxies exhibit positive and significant correlation coefficients, except Lit_Risk which is 
only correlated to diligence as measured by BRC ratio but not the BOD ratio.  Growth is negatively correlated with 
diligence. 
 
Regression Results 
 
 Our multivariate analysis consists of a series of regressions of the audit committee diligence and audit 
committee tenure proxy specifications included in Model 1.  Table 2 presents the first set of results from our 
regression analyses after defining audit committee diligence as the ratio of audit committee meetings to the four 
meetings recommended by the BRC (AC_BRC_Ratio) and measuring audit committee tenure as the average number 
of years a member served on the firm’s committee (AC_Tenure_Avg).  The model’s adjusted-R2 is 0.43 and the 
results largely support our hypotheses.  Of the audit committee characteristics (H1-H3), audit committee tenure 
(AC_Tenure_Avg) has a negative and significant coefficient (p-value = 0.0003), while the degree of audit committee 
financial expertise (Fin_Exprt) is positive and significantly (p-value < 0.0001) associated with audit committee 
diligence.  Contrary to our expectations, though, the size of the audit committee (AC_Size) is negatively, but 
insignificantly associated with audit committee diligence (p-value = 0.0118).  Variance inflation factors (not tabled) 
indicate that multicollinearity was not an issue. 
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Table 2:  Ordinary Least-Squares Regression of Dependent Variable AC_BRC_Ratio on AC_Tenure_Avg 
AC_BRC_Ratioit  =  β0 + β1AC_Tenure_Avg it  + β2 Fin_Exprtit +  β3 AC_Sizeit  + β4 BOD_Sizeit  + Β5 BOD_INDP it  + Β6 
BOD_Mtgs it  + β7 Sizeit +β8 Levit + Β9 Growthit  +  β10 Lit_Riskit + β11 Big_Fiveit + β12 SOXit +  Єi 
 
Variable Hypothesized sign Estimated coefficient Standard error p-value 
Intercept ? -0.1373 0.0893 0.1243 
AC_Tenure_Avg - -0.0252 0.0069 0.0003 
Fin_Exprt + 0.2495 0.0557 <.0001 
AC_Size + -0.0267 0.0106 0.0118 
BOD_Size + 0.0066 0.0052 0.2036 
BOD_INDP + 0.1726 0.0616 0.0051 
BOD_Mtgs + 0.0394 0.0037 <.0001 
Size + 0.0641 0.0081 <.0001 
Lev + 0.0002 0.0662 0.9965 
Growth + -0.0007 0.0034 0.8202 
Lit_Risk + 0.0777 0.0235 0.0010 
Big_Five + 0.1924 0.0702 0.0062 
SOX + 0.9564 0.0333 <.0001 
N =    2715     
Adj R2 =    0.43     
AC_BRC_Ratio equals the number of audit committee meetings held during the year divided by the four meetings recommended 
by the Blue Ribbon Committee For the rest of variable definition; please refer to the footnote to Table 1. 
 
 
 The regression coefficients on the Model (1) governance variables generally support H4 as it appears that 
stronger board of director characteristics are positive and significantly associated with audit committee diligence.  
The coefficients on BOD_Indp and BOD_Mtgs are all positive and significant, though BOD_Size has an 
insignificant effect on audit committee diligence.  Consistent with Menon and Williams (1994), and consistent with 
H5, we find that agency cost proxies are positive and significantly associated with audit committee diligence.  Size, 
Lit_Risk and Big_Five all exhibit positive and significant coefficients, while the coefficients on Lev and Growth are 
insignificant.  Consistent with other pre-post SOX 2002 studies and H6, the period following the implementation of 
the SOX 2002 is associated with greater audit committee diligence.   
 
 We also estimate Model (1) with the alternative specification (untabulated) of our measure of audit 
committee tenure (AC_Tenure_Sum) which aggregates the total number of years the audit committee members 
collectively served on a specific audit committee.  The results are consistent with those reported in Table 2 as the 
adjusted R
2
 is 0.43 and the coefficient estimates largely support H1-H6.  Specifically, AC_Tenure_Sum is negative 
and significantly associated with audit committee diligence (p-value < 0.0001), while Fin_Exprt continues to exhibit 
a positive and highly significant coefficient estimate.  The governance characteristics BOD_Indp and BOD_Mtgs, as 
well as the agency cost proxies Size, Lit_Risk and Big_Five remain positive and significantly associated with audit 
committee diligence.  Overall, the results suggest that audit committees that meet beyond the BRC’s recommended 
four times per fiscal year possess stronger audit committees, more independent and engaged boards of directors and 
are overseeing firms with greater agency costs.   
 
We continue our analysis after modifying the audit committee diligence proxy specification so that it 
measures the activity relative to the board of director activity.  Specifically, we employ AC_BOD_Ratio, which 
measures the ratio of the number of audit committee meetings to the number of board of director meetings during 
the same fiscal year.  Table 3 reports the results after re-estimating Model (1) using AC_BOD_Ratio as the 
dependent variable along with our alternative specifications of our audit committee tenure proxies.  The results are 
largely similar to those reported in Table 2. We also regress AC_BOD_Ratio on the average number of years that an 
audit committee member has served on the committee (AC_Tenure_Avg) along with our audit committee, 
governance and agency cost proxies.  The model’s adjusted R2 is slightly lower at 0.42, and the significance of the 
explanatory variables is slightly weaker than what we observed when using AC_BRC_Ratio as our dependent 
variable.  Each of the audit committee characteristics continue to be significantly associated with audit committee 
diligence, as AC_Tenure_Avg and Fin_Exprt have negative and positive coefficients, respectively, and support H1 
and H2.  Again, contrary to H3, the coefficient estimate on AC_Size is negative and significant (p-value = 0.0656). 
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Table 3:  Regression of Dependent Variable AC_BOD_Ratio on AC_Tenure_Avg  
AC_BOD_Ratioit  =  β0 + β1AC_Tenure_Avg it  + β2 Fin_Exprtit +  β3 AC_Sizeit + β4BOD_Sizeit  + Β5BOD_INDP it  + 
Β6BOD_Mtgs it  + β7Sizeit + β8Levit + Β9Growthit  +  β10Lit_Riskit + β11Big_Fiveit + β12SOXit + Єi 
Variable Hypothesized sign Estimated coefficient Standard error p-value 
Intercept ? 0.5644 0.0614 <.0001 
AC_Tenure_Avg - -0.0089 0.0047 0.0608 
Fin_Exprt + 0.1192 0.0383 0.0019 
AC_Size + -0.0134 0.0073 0.0656 
BOD_Size + 0.0025 0.0035 0.4787 
BOD_INDP + 0.0535 0.0424 0.2065 
BOD_Mtgs + -0.0650 0.0025 <.0001 
Size + 0.0300 0.0056 <.0001 
Lev + -0.0646 0.0455 0.1565 
Growth + 0.0019 0.0024 0.4253 
Lit_Risk + 0.0261 0.0162 0.1073 
Big_Five + 0.2051 0.0483 <.0001 
SOX + 0.5922 0.0229 <.0001 
N =   2715   
Adj R2 =   0.422   
AC_BOD_Ratio equals the number of annual audit committees divided by the number annual of a board of director meetings held 
during the fiscal year; remaining variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
 
 Other explanatory variables exhibit similar, albeit weaker associations when AC_BOD_Ratio is employed 
as our proxy for audit committee diligence.  Of the governance characteristics (H4), only BOD_Mtgs is significant 
(p<.0001) which is primarily due to the nature of the specification of our dependent variable, AC_BOD_Ratio; as the 
number of board meetings increases, the AC_BOD_Ratio would naturally decrease.  There continues to be some 
significant associations between our agency costs proxies (H5) and audit committee diligence.  Larger firms (Size) 
are associated with significantly greater audit committee diligence (p-value<.0001) and firms audited by Big Five 
accounting firms are also more active (p-value<.0001), particularly during the period following the implementation 
of the SOX 2002 provisions (H6) (p-value<.0001).    
 
The final modification of Model 1 includes the use of AC_BOD_Ratio and AC_Tenure_Sum.  The 
untabulated results again generally support our hypotheses as we observe significantly negative coefficient (p-value 
= 0.0025) on AC_Tenure_Sum and BOD_Mtgs, while the coefficients on Fin_Exprt, Size, Big_Five and SOX remain 
positive and significant.  Taken together, the results of our regression analyses suggest that audit committees that 
meet more frequently than either the BRC’s four recommended meetings per fiscal year, or the meetings already 
being conducted by the board of directors, are likely to have less audit committee members, greater financial 
expertise, stronger governance characteristics and greater agency costs.  An increase in audit committee diligence 
was also observed during the period following the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, suggesting 
that audit committees responded to the greater regulatory scrutiny that accompanied SOX 2002.      
 
Sensitivity Analyses 
 
 We also conducted a series of sensitivity analyses (untabulated) to determine whether our findings are 
robust to alternative specifications of Model 1.  We first considered additional agency costs proxies that may explain 
the degree of audit committee diligence.  Our original results hold after controlling for firms seeking capital through 
either an equity or debt issuance, both of which have an insignificant association with our audit committee diligence 
proxies.  We further expanded Model 1 by controlling for the number of outside directorships held by the audit 
committee members, but find that it does not have a significant influence on audit committee diligence.  We also 
specified financial expertise as a dichotomous variable equaling one when at least one member of the committee is a 
financial expert, zero otherwise and find that the coefficient remains positive and significant.  Finally, we re-
estimated Model 1 after replacing the audit committee proxies with the number of audit committee meetings 
(AC_Mtg_Freq) used by prior research (e.g., Menon and Williams, 1994) and once again observe results consistent 
with those reported in Tables 2 and 3.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
Audit committee researchers have adopted audit committee meeting frequency as a proxy for audit 
committee diligence and observe some financial reporting benefits for companies with active audit committees 
(DeZoort et al., 2002).  However, recent studies suggest that a great deal of variation exists in audit committee 
activity regardless of regulators’ concerns about inactive audit committees, with most audit committees meeting no 
more than the company’s audit committee charter requires  (Carcello, et al., 2002).  Our study extends this line of 
inquiry by exploring attributes that likely explain why some audit committees are more active than anticipated.  
Unlike related research that relies on the number of audit committee meetings held each year, our study focuses on 
the number of audit committee meetings held relative to benchmarks that likely influence audit committee activity.  
Using the ratio of audit committee meetings to the four annual meetings recommended by the BRC and the ratio of 
audit committee meetings to the number of meetings held by the board, we explore which audit committee, 
governance and agency costs attributes are associated with a greater degree of diligence.    
      
 The sample period includes 2,715 firm-year observations of S&P Small, Mid and Large-Cap companies 
spanning fiscal years 1998-2003.  At the audit committee level, we hypothesize and find that active committees are 
associated with the presence of financial experts, but that firm-specific knowledge reduces the need for frequent 
meetings.  Stronger governance structures are evident by more active and independent boards and are associated 
with greater audit committee diligence. Consistent with prior research, we also find that firms with greater agency 
costs, as indicated by firm size, litigation risk and retention of Big Five auditors, are most likely to maintain more 
diligent audit committees.  We also document an increased level of meeting activity following the implementation of 
SOX 2002, suggesting that the attention given to audit committees during that period was a sufficient catalyst for 
increased audit committee diligence and that establishing minimum meeting requirements may be unnecessary at 
this time. 
 
As more attention is placed on the regulatory environment surrounding the sphere of corporate governance, 
the behavior of key governance mechanisms will likely receive ongoing scrutiny.  Regulators, including former SEC 
Chairman Levitt, have expressed disappointment with the lack of audit committee activity and suggest that inactive 
audit committees are failing to perform their oversight duties.  Regulators, therefore, have an incentive to identify 
characteristics of firms with audit committees that appear to be more diligent so that they can, in turn, better 
understand and identify firms that fail to perform rigorous oversight of the financial reporting process.  The results 
of our study provide evidence that regulatory influence occurring on the periphery (i.e., greater scrutiny of audit 
committees from SOX 2002) will likely have an indirect and desired effect on other aspects of governance behavior 
as indicated by the increased audit committee meeting frequency that followed the implementation of many related, 
but independent SOX provisions.     
 
AUTHOR INFORMATION 
 
Mike Braswell is an assistant professor at San Francisco State University. His research interests vary, but primarily 
include the role of the audit committee in the financial reporting process and other issues affecting the financial 
reporting process. He also continues to research the historical role of accounting practices in society. E-mail:  
braswell@sfsu.edu. 
 
Roger B. Daniels is a professor at College of Charleston. His primary research interests are accounting 
thought, theory and practice. He holds a CPA certificate (Arkansas 4098, inactive). His research has appeared in 
Accounting Historians Journal, CPA Journal, Journal of Corporate Accounting and Finance, Management 
Accounting Quarterly, among other outlets. E-mail:  danielsr@cofc.edu. 
 
Mark Landis is an assistant professor at San Francisco State University.  His areas of expertise include information 
systems, group decision making, and auditor decision making. E-mail:  landism@sfsu.edu 
 
Chun-Chia (Amy) Chang is an assistant professor at San Francisco State University. Her research interest is in 
financial reporting with specific emphasis on issues relating to quality of financial reports, earnings management, 
earnings quality, and corporate governance. E-mail:  amychang@sfsu.edu. Corresponding author. 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – April 2012 Volume 10, Number 4 
204 © 2012 The Clute Institute 
REFERENCES 
 
1. Abbott, L., Y. Park and S. Parker.  2000. The effects of audit committee activity and independence on 
corporate fraud.  Managerial Finance 26: 55-67.  
2. Anderson, R.C., Mansi, S.A., and Reeb, D.M.  2004.  Board characteristics, accounting report integrity, and 
the cost of debt.  Journal of Accounting and Economics 37 (3): 315-342. 
3. Ahdolmohammadi, M. and A. Wright.  1987.  An Examination of the effects of experience and task 
complexity on audit judgments.  The Accounting Review (January): 1-13.  
4. Beasley, M. 1996. An empirical analysis of the relation between board of director composition and 
financial statement fraud.  The Accounting Review (October): 443-466.  
5. Beasley, M. S., J. V. Carcello, D. R. Hermanson, and P. Lapides. 2000. Fraudulent financial reporting: 
Consideration of industry traits and corporate governance mechanisms. Accounting Horizons (December): 
441-454. 
6. Beasley, M. S., J. V. Carcello, D. R Hermanson, and T. Neal.  2009.  The audit committee oversight 
process.  Contemporary Accounting Research 26 (1): 65-122. 
7. Bedard, J., Chtourou, S.M., and Courteau, L. 2004.  The effect of audit committee expertise, independence, 
and activity on aggressive earnings management.  Auditing A Journal of Theory and Practice 23 (2): 13-35. 
8. Blue Ribbon Committee.  1999.  Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on 
Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees.  New York Stock Exchange and National 
Association of Securities Dealers (www.nyse.com).  
9. Bradbury M.E. 1992. Voluntary disclosure of financial segment data: New Zealand evidence. Accounting 
& Finance 32 (1): 15-26. 
10. Bonner, S.and P. Walker. 1994. The effects of instruction and experience on the acquisition of auditing 
knowledge, The Accounting Review (1): pg. 157-178. 
11. Bushman, R. and A. Smith.  2001. Financial accounting information and corporate governance.  Journal of 
Accounting and Economics (32): 237-333.  
12. Carcello, J., D.R. Hermanson and T.L. Neal. 2002. Disclosures in audit committee charters and reports. 
Accounting Horizons. (December): 234-258. 
13. Carcello, J. and T. Neal. 2003. Audit committee characteristics and auditor dismissals following “new” 
going concern reports. The Accounting Review (January): 453-468. 
14. Carcello, J. and A.Nagy.  2004. Audit firm tenure and fraudulent financial reporting.  Auditing: A Journal 
of Practice and Theory (23): 55-69.  
15. Carcello, J., Hollingsworth, A. Klein and T. Neal. 2006. Audit committee financial expertise, competing 
corporate governance mechanisms, and earnings management.  Working Paper: University of Tennessee 
(February).  
16. Cohen, J., G. Krishnamoorthy, and A. Wright. 2004. The corporate governance mosaic and financial 
reporting quality.  Journal of Accounting Literature (23): 87-152.  
17. Cohen, D. A., A. Dey and T. Lys. 2008. Real and accrual-based earnings management in the pre- and post-
Sarbanes Oxley periods.  The Accounting Review, 83 (3):757-787. 
18. Collier, P. and A. Gregory. 1999.  Audit committee activity and agency costs. Journal of Accounting and 
Public Policy (18): 311-332. 
19. DeFond, M. and J, Jiambalvo.  1994.  Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics (17): 1-32. 
20. DeFond, M. 1992. The Association Between Changes in client firm agency costs and auditor 
switching. Auditing 11, no. 1 (April 1): 16-32. 
21. DeZoort, F.T., Hermanson, D.R., Archambeault, D.S., and Reed, S.A.  2002.  Audit committee 
effectiveness: A synthesis of the empirical audit committee literature.  Journal of Accounting Literature 
(21): 38-74. 
22. Dhaliwal, D., V. Naiker, and F. Navissi.  2006. Audit committee financial expertise, corporate governance 
and accruals quality: An empirical analysis. Working Paper: University of Arizona (May). 
23. Easley, P. and M. O’Hara. 2004.  Information and the cost of capital. Journal of Finance 59: 1552-1583. 
24. Francis, Jere R., and Wilson, Earl R.. 1988. Auditor changes: A joint test of theories relating to agency 
costs and auditor differentiation. The Accounting Review 63: 663-683. 
 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – April 2012 Volume 10, Number 4 
© 2012 The Clute Institute  205 
25. Francis, J., D. Philbrick and K. Schipper. 1994. Shareholder litigation and corporate disclosures. Journal of 
Accounting Research 32 (2): 137-164. 
26. Francis, J. R., E. L. Maydew and H.C. Sparks. 1999. The role of Big 6 auditors in the credible reporting of 
accruals. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 18 (2): 17-34. 
27. Francis, J., R. LaFond, P. Olsson, and K. Schipper.  2004.  Cost of equity and earnings attributes.  The 
Accounting Review 79: 967-1010. 
28. Francis, J. 2004.  What do we know about audit quality? The British Accounting Review (36): 345–368.  
29. Gordon, L.A., M. Loeb, W. Lucyshyn and T. Sohail.  2006.  The impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the 
corporate disclosures of information security activities. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 25 (5): 
503-530. 
30. Heflin, F. and C. Hsu.  2008. The impact of the SEC's regulation of non-GAAP disclosures.  Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 46 (3): 349-365 
31. Jensen, M. and W.H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and capital 
structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305-360. 
32. Johnson, V., Khurana, I. and K. Reynolds.  2002. Audit-firm tenure and the quality of financial reports. 
Contemporary Accounting Research 19: 637-660.  
33. Kasznik R. and B. Lev. 1995. To warn or not to warn: Management disclosures in the face of an earnings 
surprise. The Accounting Review 70: 113-134. 
34. Klein, A. 2002.  Audit committees, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 33: 375-400.  
35. Krishnan, J.  2005. Audit Committee Quality and Internal Control: An Empirical Analysis.  The Accounting 
Review 80: 649-675. 
36. Levitt, A.  1998.  The numbers game.  Remarks delivered at the NYU Center for Law and Business, New 
York, NY, September 28.  Washington, D.C.: SEC. 
37. Libby, R. 1993.  Judgment and decision making research in accounting and auditing. Ed. Cambridge 
University Press.  
38. Lobo, G. J. and J. Zhou. 2006 Did conservatism in financial reporting increase after the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act?  Initial evidence.  Accounting Horizons 20 (1): 57-73. 
39. Mazur, J. and R. Hastie. 1978. Learning as accumulation: A reexamination of the Learning Curve.  
Psychological Bulletin (85): 1256-1274. 
40. McMullen, D.A., and Raghundandan, K.  1996. Enhancing audit committee effectiveness.  Journal of 
Accountancy 182 (2): 79-82. 
41. Menon, K. and J.D. Williams. 1994.  The use of audit committees for monitoring. Journal of Accounting 
and Public Policy 13: 121-139. 
42. NYSE. 2005  www.nyse.com  
43. Raghunandan, K. and D. Rama. 2007. Determinants of audit committee diligence. Accounting Horizons. 
21.3 (September): 265-280. 
44. Sharma, V., V. Naider and B. Lee. 2009. Determinants of audit committee meeting frequency: Evidence 
from a voluntary governance system. Accounting Horizons 23: 245-263. 
45. Sarbanes-Oxely Act of 2002 
46. Vafeas, N. 1999.  Board meeting frequency and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics (53): 
113-142.  
47. Watts, R.L., Zimmerman, J.L., 1990. Positive accounting theory: A ten year perspective. The Accounting 
Review 65 (1): 131-156. 
48. Wild, J.J. 1996. The audit committee and earnings quality. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance 
11: 247-276.  
49. Williamson, O. 1984.  Corporate governance. Yale Law Journal (1197). 
50. Xie, B., Davidson, W.N., and DaDalt, P.J.  2003. Earnings management and corporate governance: The 
role of the board and the audit committee.  Journal of Corporate Finance (9): 295-316.  
51. Yang J. and J. Krishnan. 2005. Audit committees and quarterly earnings management. International 
Journal of Auditing (9): 201-219. 
 
 
 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – April 2012 Volume 10, Number 4 
206 © 2012 The Clute Institute 
NOTES 
